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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Under a statutory provision known as the “Hyde 
Amendment,” a district court in criminal cases “may award to 
a prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable 
attorney‟s fee and other litigation expenses, where the court 
finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, 
frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special 
circumstances make such an award unjust.”  Pub. L. No. 105-
119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997), reprinted in 18 
U.S.C. § 3006A, Statutory Note.  Louis Manzo appeals a 
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decision of the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey denying him such relief.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm. 
 
I. Background 
 
In October 2009, a grand jury returned a six-count 
indictment against Manzo, charging him with four counts of 
conspiring and attempting to commit extortion, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) & 2 (the “Hobbs Act”), and two counts 
of traveling in interstate commerce to promote and facilitate 
bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952(a)(3) & 2 (the 
“Travel Act”).  In pertinent part, the Hobbs Act defines 
“extortion” as “the obtaining of property from another, with 
his consent, induced … under color of official right.”  Id. 
§ 1951(b)(2).  The relevant portions of the Travel Act 
criminalize “travel[] in interstate … commerce … with intent 
to … promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the 
promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of 
any unlawful activity.”  Id. § 1952(a)(3).  An “unlawful 
activity” includes “bribery” as established by “the laws of the 
State in which [the bribery is] committed.”  Id. § 1952(b). 
 
The government alleged that Manzo, while he was a 
candidate for mayor of Jersey City, New Jersey, sought cash 
payments and campaign contributions from Solomon Dwek, 
who was posing as a real estate developer, and that, in 
exchange, Manzo indicated he would help Dwek in the future 
with matters involving Jersey City‟s government.  According 
to the indictment, Manzo and his brother, Ronald Manzo, 
accepted as bribes three cash payments prior to the election, 
totaling $27,500.  The indictment also alleged that Dwek had 
agreed to pay additional money after the election, assuming 
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Manzo won (which he did not).  Unbeknownst to the Manzo 
brothers, Dwek was a government informant. 
 
On May 18, 2010, following a motion to dismiss filed 
by Manzo, the District Court dismissed each count alleging 
that Manzo had violated the Hobbs Act.  The Court held that 
the alleged extortion did not constitute a violation of the Act 
because Manzo was not a public official at the time of the 
conduct and therefore could not have acted “„under color of 
official right.‟”  (Order on Motion in Limine at 24 (D.N.J. 
May 18, 2010), ECF No. 33 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)).)  
The Court did not dismiss the remaining Travel Act charges, 
however, reasoning that “the plain reading of” New Jersey‟s 
bribery statute (Supplemental App. at 166) – which provides 
that “[i]t is no defense to prosecution … that a person whom 
the actor sought to influence was not qualified to act in the 
desired way whether because he had not yet assumed office 
… or for any other reason,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:27-2 – “is 
that it encompasses prosecutions where the person whom the 
action was sought to influence was not yet qualified or [able] 
to act” (Supplemental App. at 166). 
 
The government filed an interlocutory appeal pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 challenging the dismissal of the Hobbs 
Act charges, and we affirmed.  See United States v. Manzo, 
636 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 2011).  Although we acknowledged that 
whether the Hobbs Act applies to a candidate for public office 
(as opposed to someone who is already in office) is “a 
significant and novel question” that was “creatively framed 
and well-presented by the government,” id. at 61, we 
ultimately affirmed the holding of the District Court, 
reasoning that, “[i]n accordance with the legislative history, 
the congressional purpose underlying the Hobbs Act and 
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centuries of interpretation of the phrase „under color of 
official right,‟” Manzo and his brother “were not acting 
„under color of official right,‟ as defined in the Hobbs Act,” 
id. at 65. 
 
With the dismissal of the Hobbs Act charges, the case 
was remanded to the District Court.  In the meantime, the 
grand jury returned a second superseding indictment charging 
Manzo with two counts of Travel Act violations, and one 
count of misprision of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4.
1
  
On February 17, 2012, however, the District Court reversed 
its earlier position and held that the receipt of something of 
value by an unsuccessful candidate for public office in 
exchange for a promise of future official conduct does not 
constitute bribery under the New Jersey bribery statute and 
therefore does not qualify as an “unlawful activity” under the 
Travel Act.  The Court accordingly dismissed all remaining 
charges against Manzo.
2
   
                                              
1
 That statute provides: 
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual 
commission of a felony cognizable by a court 
of the United States, conceals and does not as 
soon as possible make known the same to 
some judge or other person in civil or 
military authority under the United States, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than three years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 4. 
2
 The Court dismissed the misprision of a felony 
charge because, given its dismissal of the Hobbs Act and 
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After all of the charges against him had been 
dismissed, Manzo filed a pro se petition on March 14, 2012, 
seeking attorney fees pursuant to the Hyde Amendment, 
which, as earlier quoted, permits an award of fees and 
expenses to a party subjected to vexatious, frivolous, or bad 
faith prosecution.  Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 
2440, 2519 (1997), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, Statutory 
Note.  The District Court denied that petition, holding that 
Manzo had not borne his burden of demonstrating that the 
prosecution in this case fits the criteria of the Hyde 
Amendment.  Manzo then filed this timely appeal of that 
order.   
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
have not considered what standard of review applies to a 
district court‟s denial of a defendant‟s request for attorney 
fees under the Hyde Amendment, but all of the Courts of 
Appeals that have considered the issue have concluded that 
review is for abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Lain, 
640 F.3d 1134, 1137 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. Beeks, 
266 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wade, 255 
F.3d 833, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. True, 250 
F.3d 410, 421-22 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Lindberg, 
220 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000); In re 1997 Grand Jury, 
215 F.3d 430, 436 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Truesdale, 
                                                                                                     
Travel Act charges, neither Manzo nor his brother had 
committed any “felony” that was “cognizable by a court of 
the United States.”  18 U.S.C. § 4.   
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211 F.3d 898, 905-06 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 1999).  We agree 
and will review the District Court‟s order under that standard. 
 
III. Discussion 
 
Manzo contends that the District Court abused its 
discretion in denying him “a reasonable attorney‟s fee and 
other litigation expenses” for what he claims was a 
“vexatious, frivolous, or … bad faith” prosecution by the 
government.  Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 
2519 (1997).  Although we have not interpreted the Hyde 
Amendment, many of our sister circuits have.  According to 
those courts, the Hyde Amendment “places a daunting 
obstacle before defendants who seek to obtain attorney fees 
and costs from the government following a successful defense 
of criminal charges.”  United v. Isaiah, 434 F.3d 513, 519 
(6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
particular, a “defendant must show that the government‟s 
position underlying the prosecution amounts to prosecutorial 
misconduct – a prosecution brought vexatiously, in bad faith, 
or so utterly without foundation in law or fact as to be 
frivolous.”  United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1299 
(11th Cir. 1999).  “The defendant bears the burden of meeting 
any one of the three grounds under the statute, and acquittal 
by itself does not suffice.”  Isaiah, 434 F.3d at 519; see also 
United States v. Shaygan, 652 F.3d 1297, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 
2011) (“[T]he Hyde Amendment place[s] the burden” of 
showing that a prosecution is “vexatious, frivolous, or in bad 
faith” on “the defendant, not on the government” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Capener, 608 
F.3d 392, 401 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that “the burden is on 
the defendant” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United 
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States v. Knott, 256 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Hyde 
Amendment places the burden of proof on the defendant to 
demonstrate that the government‟s position was vexatious, 
frivolous, or in bad faith.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
 
That burden is made more difficult by the approach 
courts take in assessing the government‟s litigation position.  
In determining whether a position is vexatious, frivolous or in 
bad faith, courts “make only one finding, which should be 
based on the case as an inclusive whole.  A count-by-count 
analysis is inconsistent with this approach.”  United States v. 
Heavrin, 330 F.3d 723, 730 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  In addition, when the legal 
issue is one of first impression, a court should be wary of 
awarding fees and costs so as not to “chill the ardor of 
prosecutors and prevent them from prosecuting with 
earnestness and vigor.  The Hyde Amendment was not 
intended to do that.”  Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1303. 
 
With respect to the three grounds for relief under the 
statute, courts have held that a “vexatious” position is one that 
is “without reasonable or probable cause or excuse.”  Id. 
1298-99 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United 
States v. Lain, 640 F.3d 1134, 1137 (10th Cir. 2011) (same); 
United States v. Monson, 636 F.3d 435, 439 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(same).   To establish that the government‟s prosecution was 
“vexatious,” a petitioner must show “both … that the criminal 
case was objectively deficient, in that it lacked either legal 
merit or factual foundation, and … that the government‟s 
conduct, when viewed objectively, manifests maliciousness 
or an intent to harass or annoy.”  Knott, 256 F.3d at 29.   
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Courts have interpreted a “frivolous” action as one that 
is “groundless[,] with little prospect of success.”  Gilbert, 198 
F.3d at 1299 (alteration and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Heavrin, 330 F.3d at 728 (adopting the 
Gilbert court‟s definition of “frivolous”); United States v. 
Braunstein, 281 F.3d 982, 995 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); In re 
1997 Grand Jury, 215 F.3d 430, 436 (4th Cir. 2000) (same).  
“[A] case is frivolous when the government‟s position was 
foreclosed by binding precedent or [is] obviously wrong … .”  
Capener, 608 F.3d at 401 (first alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “Just because the government 
lacks „precedent‟ does not automatically mean that its 
position is frivolous.”  Heavrin, 330 F.3d at 729.  “The 
government should be allowed to base a prosecution on a 
novel argument, so long as it is a reasonable one, without fear 
that it might be setting itself up for liability under the Hyde 
Amendment.”  Id.  Thus, “[a] frivolous position is one lacking 
a reasonable legal basis or where the government lacks a 
reasonable expectation of attaining sufficient material 
evidence by the time of trial.”  Id.  A “frivolous” position can 
be distinguished from a “vexatious” one in that “the term 
„vexatious‟ embraces the distinct concept of being brought for 
the purpose of irritating, annoying, or tormenting the 
opposing party.”  Id.   
 
Finally, “bad faith” means “not simply bad judgment 
or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a 
wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; … it 
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with 
furtive design or ill will.”  Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1299 
(omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978) (defining bad 
faith in the law enforcement context to include “reckless 
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disregard for the truth”).  Courts engage in an objective 
inquiry when determining whether a prosecution was pursued 
in “bad faith.”  See Shaygan, 652 F.3d at 1313-14.   
 
Against that legal background, we examine each of 
Manzo‟s arguments. 
 
 A. Continued Prosecution After Dismissal of 
 Hobbs Act Charges 
 
Manzo contends that his prosecution was either 
vexatious or frivolous because, even after we affirmed the 
District Court‟s dismissal of the Hobbs Act charges, the 
government continued to pursue him on the remaining Travel 
Act and misprision of a felony charges.  Manzo insists that, 
by nonetheless proceeding with its prosecution, the 
government “was nothing less th[a]n defiant, and the second 
superseding indictment no longer supported a position of first 
impression.”  (Manzo‟s Opening Br. at 19.) 
 
That charge fails to establish an abuse of discretion.  
The District Court dismissed the Hobbs Act charges because, 
during the time of the alleged conduct, Manzo was only a 
candidate for public office and therefore did not act “„under 
color of official right.‟”  (Order on Motion in Limine at 24 
(D.N.J. May 18, 2010), ECF No. 33 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1951(a)).)  At the same time, however, the Court declined 
to dismiss the Travel Act charges and expressly rejected 
Manzo‟s argument that, because he was “merely a candidate 
and not one that was at least elected,” his conduct did not fall 
within New Jersey‟s bribery statute.  (Supplemental App. at 
166.)  The Court opined that, under a “plain reading,” the 
bribery statute “encompasses prosecutions where the person 
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whom the action was sought to influence was not yet 
qualified or [able] to act in a desired way for any reason.”  
(Supplemental App. at 166.)  As noted earlier, we affirmed on 
interlocutory appeal the dismissal of the Hobbs Act charges.  
It was only then that, upon reconsideration, the District Court 
dismissed the Travel Act charges because it concluded that 
New Jersey‟s bribery statute does not criminalize bribes to 
candidates for public office (as opposed to officeholders).   
 
Given the District Court‟s original ruling on the 
applicability of the New Jersey bribery statute, the 
government‟s continued prosecution of Manzo under the 
remaining Travel Act charges was clearly not vexatious, since 
it was not “objectively deficient.”  Knott, 256 F.3d at 29.  Nor 
was it frivolous.  “Once a district court judge accepts the 
government‟s legal position it will be extremely difficult to 
persuade us that the issue was not debatable among 
reasonable lawyers and jurists, i.e., that it was frivolous.”  
Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1304.  In fact, the District Court‟s 
original ruling on the applicability of the New Jersey bribery 
statute left the government with an objectively reasonable 
belief that its legal position would prevail.  We accordingly 
reject Manzo‟s argument that the government‟s continued 
prosecution was vexatious or frivolous. 
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B. Manzo’s Claim that the Government Knew that 
Its Factual Allegations Were False 
 
Manzo also argues that the allegations in the 
indictment were “blatantly false,” that the government knew 
they were false, and that the government‟s prosecution was 
therefore in bad faith, as well as being vexatious and 
frivolous.  (Manzo‟s Opening Br. at 6.)  Those assertions rely 
primarily on the fact that, when he testified in a separate 
corruption trial, Ronald Manzo said he never physically gave 
his brother $10,000 in cash that he had received from Dwek.   
 
That testimony does not conclusively prove that the 
government‟s accusations were false, much less that they 
were knowingly false.  Nor does the testimony prove that the 
District Court abused its discretion.  As the Court noted, 
despite Ronald‟s testimony, the government was prepared to 
present recordings “during which both Ronald Manzo and 
[Louis Manzo] acknowledged that [Louis Manzo] had 
received money from Mr. Dwek.”  (Supplemental App. at 
14.)  In addition, even if Ronald‟s testimony were true, the 
charges against Manzo did not require the government to 
prove that he physically received a cash bribe, only that he 
traveled in interstate commerce with the intent to “promote, 
manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, 
management, establishment, or carrying on of” a bribe, 18 
U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), which, under New Jersey law, 
encompasses the “indirect[]” acceptance of “[a]ny benefit as 
consideration for a decision, opinion, recommendation, vote 
or exercise of discretion of a public servant,” N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:27-2.  The recordings would have allowed the 
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government to plausibly argue that Manzo was aware of the 
cash payment to his brother and played a role in facilitating it.  
Thus, Ronald‟s testimony that Manzo never received the cash 
payments, even if we assume it to be true, is insufficient to 
show that the government‟s prosecution in light of that 
testimony was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith. 
 
C. Conflicts of Interest 
 
Manzo avers that the prosecutors in his case operated 
under “overbearing conflicts of interest” and should have 
recused themselves under “numerous” Department of Justice 
guidelines.  (Manzo‟s Opening Br. at 14.)  Specifically, he 
asserts that, while running for governor of New Jersey, then-
United States Attorney Chris Christie lauded his office‟s anti-
corruption prosecutions and publicly proclaimed that, as 
Governor, he would hire several Assistant United States 
Attorneys who had played a role in prosecuting over 40 
individuals for corruption in Hudson County, New Jersey, 
including Manzo.  According to Manzo, shortly after 
candidate Christie made that statement, a number of 
prosecutors donated to Christie‟s campaign.  Despite those 
donations and Christie‟s public statement that he would hire 
them, the prosecutors, according to Manzo, “failed to recuse 
themselves from an investigation and prosecution that 
ultimately benefitted Christie‟s election, and by so doing, 
enhanced their employment prospects for the jobs that they 
were promised.”  (Manzo‟s Opening Br. at 14.)  Manzo 
insists that the prosecutors‟ supposed failure to adhere to 
recusal guidelines constitutes “bad faith.”   
 
The government vigorously denies that any of the 
prosecutors violated recusal guidelines, which may well be 
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correct, but we need not address the issue.  As already noted, 
“Congress created an objective standard of bad faith to 
govern an award of attorney‟s fees and costs under the Hyde 
Amendment.”  Shaygan, 652 F.3d at 1313.  We accordingly 
should not “read the Hyde Amendment to license judicial 
second-guessing of prosecutions that are objectively 
reasonable.”  Id. at 1314.  Thus, rather than attempting to 
delve into the minds and motivations of individual 
prosecutors when making political contributions or career 
moves, the proper inquiry into a challenged prosecution is an 
objective one.  Here, in a wide-ranging undercover 
investigation, the FBI obtained recorded conversations in 
which Manzo, a candidate for political office, agreed to 
accept money in exchange for a promise of future official 
action if elected.  Under those circumstances, it was not 
objectively unreasonable for the government to attempt to 
prosecute him under the Hobbs Act and the Travel Act.  At 
the time of the indictment, there was no binding case law 
holding that such prosecutions were improper, and it was 
entirely legitimate for the government to initiate a federal 
prosecution based on the underlying facts.  The District Court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Manzo‟s 
conflict-of-interest argument. 
 
 D. Manzo’s Remaining Allegations of 
 Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Manzo‟s remaining miscellaneous allegations of bad 
faith are also unavailing.  He claims that the government 
failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury and 
failed to preserve the instructions given to Dwek by the FBI 
prior to his covert meetings with the Manzos.  The District 
Court rejected those claims, holding that Manzo had not 
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borne his burden of proof on them.  But even if he had, those 
failures would at most constitute prosecutorial errors, rather 
than a basis to conclude that the prosecution was undertaken 
and pursued in bad faith.  “Sloppy work alone does not 
support a claim of vexatiousness, frivolousness, or bad faith” 
sufficient to justify attorney fees under the Hyde Amendment.  
Lain, 640 F.3d at 1139.  Moreover, as the District Court 
noted, the second superseding indictment against Manzo was 
dismissed prior to trial, and the Jencks Act requires 
production of documents relied on by a government witness 
only “[a]fter [the] witness called by the United States has 
testified on direct examination” at trial.  18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). 
 
Manzo also argues that Dwek was not authorized 
under Department of Justice guidelines to engage in 
undercover activities with Manzo because Manzo was not yet 
a public official.  Whether that is correct is irrelevant, for, 
even assuming that the government mishandled Dwek in 
some respects, the alleged errors would not demonstrate that 
the government‟s prosecution of Manzo was vexatious, 
frivolous, or in bad faith, which is the standard that Manzo 
must meet for an award of attorney fees.  We find no abuse of 
discretion in the District Court‟s decision. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court. 
